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Abstract 
We tested the hypothesis that shared emotions, notably anger, influence the formation of 
new self-categories. We first measured participants’ (N = 89) emotional reactions to a 
proposal to make university assessment tougher before providing feedback about the 
reactions of eight other co-present individuals. This feedback always contained information 
about the other individuals’ attitudes to the proposals (four opposed and four not opposed), 
and in the experimental condition emotion information (of those opposed, two were angry, 
two were sad). Participants self-categorized more with, and preferred to work with angry 
rather than sad targets, but only when participants’ own anger was high. These findings 
support the idea that emotions are a potent determinant of self-categorization, even in the 
absence of existing, available self-categories. 
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“Fury, us”: Anger as a basis for new group self-categories 
The role of self-categorization – defining oneself in terms of a salient group 
membership – in shaping emotions has been highlighted by a growing literature on group-
based emotions (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). What we 
feel when the interests of a group are advanced or threatened depends on the extent to which 
we define ourselves as members of that group. However, this literature has largely neglected 
the possibility that the reverse relation might also hold: Emotions might provide a basis for 
self-categorization and the emergence of new social identities (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; 
Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). It is this possibility that we sought to test in the present 
research.  
The paucity of research on how emotion might shape group identities is all the more 
striking when viewed from the perspective of theories that emphasize the communicative role 
of emotions in allowing us to calibrate our own orientation to events and to other people 
(Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2003; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 1996, 2001; 
Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Peters & Kashima, 2007). A separate line of research 
in the tradition of self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) suggests that the degree to which individuals’ attributes ‘fit’ with each other 
(in terms of compatibility and content) in a particular context influences the extent to which 
they see themselves as sharing a group identity (Blanz, 1999; Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, & 
Haslam, 1991).  
Integrating these perspectives, we propose that shared emotions have the potential to 
influence self-categorization, including the formation of ‘new’ self-categories (e.g., Drury & 
Reicher, 2000; Peters & Kashima, 2007). Although previous research has examined the effect 
of emotion and mood on categorization and information processing (e.g., Bramesfeld & 
Gasper, 2008; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Isbell, Lair, & 
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Rovenpor, 2013; Schwarz & Clore, 2002; Zivot, Cohen, & Kapucu, 2013), this has not 
directly addressed the role of emotion in self-categorization, particularly in interaction with 
emotional information coming from others. The only existing test of this hypothesis has 
shown that emotions – and anger in particular – strengthen pre-existing self-categorization 
when the emotional reaction is shared within this group (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, 
Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011). However, the idea that emotion can evoke a new group identity, 
purely on the basis of a shared emotional response, has never been tested. Providing such a 
test is the primary goal of the current research. 
Building on the SCT principles of comparative and normative fit (Oakes, 1987), we 
developed the concept of ‘emotional fit’ as a basis for our prediction that shared anger would 
lead to particularly strong tendencies to self-categorize with others (Livingstone et al., 2011). 
Emotional fit refers specifically to the fit between the content of an emotion and group-based 
representations and action. Thus, when an event evokes anger in the self, the knowledge that 
others share this emotion should reinforce – or in the present case, actually create – an “us–
them” distinction (Livingstone et al., 2011). This is because appraisals underlying anger refer 
more to another agent as the source of injustice (Frijda, 1986), and the target of opprobrium 
(i.e., the relevant outgroup), making it more relational and potentially more “groupy” than 
other emotional reactions such as happiness (Livingstone et al., 2011; see also Thomas et al., 
2009) or, in the present case, sadness.  
We tested these hypotheses by presenting undergraduate student participants – in 
groups of nine – with an emotion-evoking scenario (proposals to make university assessment 
tougher) and assessing their emotional reaction to it, and then varying whether or not the 
apparent emotional reaction of other participants was communicated to participants. The 
information given to participants showed that four of the eight other participants were against 
the proposals. In the experimental (but not the control) condition two of these felt angry, and 
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the other two felt sad. This design allowed us to focus on the role of emotion – and anger in 
particular – over and above the attitude that the emotion may signal, which was constant 
across angry and sad targets. In particular, the design permitted a comparison between a 
condition in which targets and the participant matched only in attitudes and one in which they 
matched in attitudes and anger. The critical test of our hypothesis was whether self-
categorization would be influenced by the presence of this emotional information. If 
emotions provide a meaningful basis for self-categorization, then self-categorization with 
these participants should be affected by the content of the targets’ emotions, in interaction 
with participants’ own level of anger. Specifically, it should be greater when own anger is 
high, and the content of the targets’ emotion is known to be anger. 
We examined self-categorization using two indicators (social distance and shared 
categorization) derived from a sociogram, a non-reactive, unstructured measure that allows 
respondents to describe social relationships in terms of spatial location (Moreno, 1953). 
Although the sociogram is typically used to examine inter-personal relationships, we adapted 
it to examine participants’ subjective sense of shared categorization with others. We were 
also concerned with the behavioral outcomes of the processes described above, and 
specifically whether any effects of self-categorization would translate into a desire to work 
together with those who shared one’s own emotional reaction. A third outcome measure 
therefore involved the selection of other participants as team members for a subsequent task. 
We expected that this selection would follow a similar pattern to that predicted for the self-
categorization measures described above. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Ninety undergraduate students of psychology participated in return for course credit. 
One participant was subsequently excluded because of a number of missing data, leaving a 
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final sample of 89 participants (81 female, eight male; M age = 19.57 years, SD = 1.83). The 
study had a 2 (other participants’ emotions communicated vs. not communicated) condition 
between-subjects design. Sample size was determined by a combination of participant 
availability and the need for adequate power to test the two- and three-way interactions 
described below. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were tested in group sessions, and were told that they were being grouped 
with eight of the other participants. They each sat in front of a computer in the same room. 
All materials with the exception of the sociogram were presented via computer, and no 
interaction took place between participants. Their first task was to respond to questions about 
their hobbies/interests, university society memberships, time of day preference 
(morning/evening/neither), favorite animal, and favorite color. They responded by typing 
answers into text boxes. 
 Participants were then presented with a bogus but nevertheless plausible report 
arguing that it had become too easy to obtain high grades on university courses, and that steps 
were being taken to make university assessment tougher. Participants’ anger (“The proposed 
measures against degree inflation make me feel… angry/resentful/annoyed/furious”; = 
.912), and sadness (sad/hopeless/miserable/dejected; = .877) in response to these proposals 
were measured using 4-item scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 12 (extremely). To disguise 
our focus on anger and sadness, measures of happiness and indifference were also taken. 
 Communication of targets’ emotion. Participants were then presented with a table 
ostensibly summarizing the biographical information and attitudinal responses of the other 
eight participants. This information was pre-determined. In the emotions communicated 
condition, the table contained biographical information, attitude to the proposal for tougher 
grading, and their dominant emotion about the proposal for tougher grading. The table 
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indicated that four (targets 2, 5, 6 and 9) of the eight other participants were against the 
proposal. Of these four, two (targets 2 and 6) were angry and two (targets 5 and 9) were sad. 
The remaining four participants did not oppose the proposal. Of these four, two (targets 1 and 
8) were pleased and two (targets 3 and 7) were indifferent. In the emotions not communicated 
(color) condition, the dominant emotion about the proposal for tougher grading was replaced 
by information about participants’ favorite color. Each emotion was matched with a specific 
color (angry = blue; sad = red; indifferent = green; happy = yellow), so that in a basic 
perceptual sense, the information differentiated between targets to the same extent in both 
conditions. This also ensured that the presence or absence of targets’ emotion was not 
confounded with information load or visual content. The remaining biographical information 
was also varied among participants so that it was not systematically related to attitudes or 
emotions.  
 Sociogram. Social distance and shared categorization were measured using a 
sociogram, consisting of a sheet of white paper in landscape orientation with a ‘+’ printed in 
the center of the page. Each participant in the session had ostensibly been assigned a unique 
number from 1 to 9; participants were always assigned the number 4.  
Social distance was assessed by asking participants to write their own number (‘4’) 
next to the ‘+’ to represent themselves, and then the numbers of the other eight participants 
elsewhere on the page, with greater distances indicating greater social distance. The social 
distance score for targets 2 and 6 (the ‘angry’ targets) combined was calculated by averaging 
the distance in centimeters between the participant and each of these targets. A similar score 
was calculated for targets 5 and 9 (the ‘sad’ targets).  
Shared categorization was assessed by asking participants to indicate how they 
thought participants should be grouped. They did this by drawing as many or as few circles as 
they thought appropriate around the numbers representing participants (including their own 
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number). Self-categorization with targets 2 and 6 (the ‘angry’ targets) was measured by 
summing how many of them were included in a group with the self. This yielded a score 
ranging from 0 to 2. The same was done for targets 5 and 9 (the ‘sad’ targets) to create a 
measure of self-categorization with them. The accompanying instructions are available as 
supplementary materials.  
Selection of task group members. Participants were told that they would later be 
performing a task as part of a 3-person group. Although there was no guarantee that they 
would get to work with the people they chose, they could nevertheless indicate the two fellow 
participants with whom they would like to work. Participants then selected two other 
participants from the possible eight. How many of targets 2 and 6 and how many of targets 5 
and 9 were selected as preferred group members was measured, providing two scores ranging 
from 0 to 2.1 
Results 
Social distance from, shared categorization with, and selection of angry and sad 
targets as team members were analyzed in mixed ANCOVAs. The design of each ANCOVA 
included the main effect terms of targets (repeated: targets 2 and 6 v. targets 5 and 9), 
condition (emotion communicated vs. not communicated [color]) own anger (continuous, 
mean-centered) and own sadness (continuous, mean-centered). It also included all 2-way 
interaction terms with the exception of the own anger X own sadness term, and all 3-way 
interaction terms with the exception of those involving both own sadness and own anger2. 
This model allowed us to test the interactive effect of targets’ emotion, condition and own 
anger while controlling for the effect of own sadness as a main effect and in the interaction 
terms, and vice versa. An example of the SPSS syntax used can be found in the 
supplementary materials. 
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Social distance  
 For social distance, the 3-way interaction between targets, condition and own anger 
was significant, F(1, 83) = 9.93, p = .002, p2 = .107, and is illustrated in the upper panels of 
Figure 1. The 3-way interaction between targets, condition and own sadness was not 
significant (F < 1), indicating that the effect was uniquely due to own anger rather than own 
sadness or general negative affect. Further analysis of the interaction involving own anger 
revealed that the two-way interaction between condition and own anger was highly 
significant for targets 2 and 6 (the ‘angry’ targets), F(1, 83) = 7.50, p = .008, p2 = .083, but 
non-significant for targets 5 and 9 (the ‘sad’ targets), F < 1. The two-way interaction between 
condition and own sadness was not significant for targets 2 and 6 or for targets 5 and 9, Fs < 
1. 
Simple effects analyses on social distance to targets 2 and 6 confirmed that when 
participants’ own anger was high (M + 1SD), participants felt closer to these targets to a 
greater extent when the targets’ emotions were communicated rather than not communicated, 
F(1, 83) = 5.24, p = .025, p2 = .059. There was also a significant effect of condition when 
participants’ own anger was low (M – 1SD), but in the opposite direction – that is, 
participants felt more distant from these targets when the targets’ emotions were 
communicated, F(1, 83) = 5.11, p = .026, p2 = .058. 
A second set of planned contrasts tested the social distance to targets 2 and 6 relative 
to targets 5 and 9, which is indicative of a preference for one pair over the other. This 
revealed that when participants’ own anger was high (M + 1SD), participants felt closer to 
targets 2 and 6 rather than to targets 5 and 9, but only when the targets’ emotions were 
communicated, F(1, 83) = 4.05, p = .047, p2 = .047 (F(1, 83) = 2.31, p = .132, p2 = .027 
when emotions were not communicated). 
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Shared categorization 
 For shared categorization, the 3-way interaction between targets, condition and own 
anger was also highly significant, F(1, 81) = 5.69, p = .019, p2 = .066, and is illustrated in 
the middle panels of Figure 1. Again, the 3-way interaction between targets’ emotion, 
condition and own sadness was not significant (F < 1), indicating that the effect was uniquely 
due to own anger rather than own sadness. Further analysis of the interaction involving own 
anger revealed that the two-way interaction between condition and own anger was highly 
significant for targets 2 and 6 (the ‘angry’ targets), F(1, 83) = 7.73, p = .007, p2 = .085, but 
non-significant for targets 5 and 9 (the ‘sad’ targets), F < 1. The two-way interaction between 
condition and own sadness was not significant for targets 2 and 6 or for targets 5 and 9, Fs < 
1. 
Simple effects analyses on shared categorization with targets 2 and 6 confirmed that 
when participants’ own anger was high (M + 1SD), participants self-categorized with these 
targets to a greater extent when the targets’ emotions were communicated rather than not 
communicated, F(1, 81) = 6.67, p = .012, p2 = .076. There was no significant effect of 
condition when participants’ own anger was low (M – 1SD), F < 1. 
A second set of planned contrasts testing shared categorization with targets 2 and 6 
relative to targets 5 and 9 revealed that when participants’ own anger was high (M + 1SD), 
participants shared categorization to a greater extent with targets 2 and 6 than with targets 5 
and 9, but only when the targets’ emotions were communicated, F(1, 81) = 6.73, p = .011, p2 
= .077  (F(1, 81) = 2.96, p = .089, p2 = .035 when emotions were not communicated). 
 Team member selection 
For team member selection, the 3-way interaction between targets’ emotion, condition 
and own anger was also highly significant3, F(1, 83) = 6.77, p = .011, p2 = .075, and is 
illustrated in the lower panels of Figure 1. The 3-way interaction between targets’ emotion, 
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condition and own sadness was not significant (F < 1), indicating that the effect was uniquely 
due to own anger rather than own sadness. Further analysis on the interaction involving own 
anger revealed that the two-way interaction between condition and own anger was highly 
significant for targets 2 and 6 (the ‘angry’ targets), F(1, 83) = 7.62, p = .007, p2 = .084, but 
non-significant for targets 5 and 9 (the ‘sad’ targets), F(1, 83) = 2.19, p = .143, p2 = .026. 
The two-way interaction between condition and own sadness was not significant for targets 2 
and 6 or for targets 5 and 9, Fs ≤ 1.1. 
Simple effects analyses on selection of targets 2 and 6 confirmed that when 
participants’ own anger was high (M + 1SD), participants selected these targets to a greater 
extent when the targets’ emotions were communicated rather than not communicated, F(1, 
83) = 8.70, p = .004, p2 = .095. There was no significant effect of condition when 
participants’ own anger was low (M – 1SD), F(1, 83) = 2.67, p = .106, p2 = .031. 
A second set of planned contrasts testing selection of targets 2 and 6 relative to targets 
5 and 9 revealed that when participants’ own anger was high (M + 1SD), participants selected 
targets 2 and 6 to a greater extent than targets 5 and 9, but only when the targets’ emotions 
were communicated, F(1, 83) = 5.55, p = .021, p2 = .063  (F = 1.54 when emotions were not 
communicated). 
Discussion 
Consistent with our hypotheses, when participants’ own anger was high, they felt 
closer to, shared categorization to a greater extent with, and were more likely to select targets 
2 and 6 as co-workers when the targets’ emotions were communicated. That is, knowing that 
these targets felt angry (as opposed to just knowing their attitude) shaped participants’ self-
categorical relationship with these targets, but only when participants themselves also felt 
angry. Participants also felt closer to, shared categorization to a greater extent with, and were 
more likely to select these targets as co-workers than targets 5 and 9 (the ‘sad’ targets) when 
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the targets’ emotions were communicated, despite the fact that all of these targets ostensibly 
shared the same attitude towards the situation. These patterns did not emerge in relation to 
own sadness, suggesting that anger can be especially powerful as a basis for self-
categorization in contexts involving transgressions by others. These findings together suggest 
that the consequences of emotional fit are not simply perceptual; rather, they have the 
potential to translate into co-ordinated behavior through their effect on perceptions of 
relevant self-categories – and indeed, by helping to create relevant self-categories (Haslam, 
1997; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). 
Importantly, these effects occurred despite the fact that the targets’ explicit attitudes 
towards the proposal were identical. We can also rule out alternative explanations based on 
information load, which was constant across conditions. Moreover, self-categorization with 
unknown others occurred in the absence of any pre-existing or pre-defined categories that 
could have directed them towards particular targets. This to our knowledge represents the 
first demonstration of truly emergent or new self-categorization on the basis of emotions. To 
this end, our use of a sociogram method to assess categorization is an innovation that helps to 
surmount a number of issues when it comes to gauging self-categorization, particularly with 
‘new’ or emergent self-categories. Specifically, verbal (e.g., Oakes et al., 1991) or other 
spatial (e.g., Schubert & Otten, 2002) measures of self-categorization involve presupposing 
to some degree the relevance and labelling of relevant categories, as do other methods of 
assessing self-categorization such as the ‘who said what’ paradigm (e.g., Blanz, 1999). When 
it comes to assessing emergent self-categories, such methods present problems such as 
demand characteristics or other forms of reactivity. In contrast, the participant-driven 
specification of categories in the sociogram represents a truly ‘bottom-up’ assessment of 
emergent self-categorization that is suited to the task of addressing the role of emotion in 
social identity formation.  
Anger and emergent self-categorization     13 
While our design did allow us to at least partially test the effect of emotion over and 
above that of attitude, further research is needed to disentangle the precise role of emotions as 
a signal to self-categorization, for example by controlling for any effect of emotion content 
on the perceived intensity of targets’ attitudes. Nevertheless, the present findings go some 
way to showing that emotions have particular value and power in shaping self-categorization 
because they communicate an impassioned, involved stance towards events, along with 
claims about possible and proper courses of (collective) action (Frijda, 1986; Livingstone et 
al., 2011; Parkinson, 1996; Thomas et al., 2009). Moreover, they have the potential to do so 
in a short-hand, readily-interpretable manner that helps to explain how communication and 
social co-ordination can occur in unfolding interactions involving groups, from small group 
settings to larger scale collective events (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2000).  
Relatedly, our focus on anger in the present research should not be seen as suggesting 
that other emotions such as sadness, or even positive emotions such as happiness play no role 
in regulating social identity. In keeping with the notion of emotional fit, sadness may be more 
affirming of a shared identity in certain contexts (e.g., a funeral) than, say, anger (see also 
Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Further, the specific object of the emotion is also likely to be 
important. In the present case, the object of the emotion is a potential change that is primarily 
negative from the perspective of participants. Amongst the constellation of negative emotions 
that could arise from appraisals of this change, anger is likely to be especially potent in 
shaping self-categorization because of the its other-focused nature and the action orientation 
that differentiates it from emotions such as sadness (Frijda, 1986). It follows that if, in 
contrast, the object of emotion is a potential positive change (e.g., something that would be of 
benefit or would be welcomed by perceivers), then happiness or associated positive, active 
emotions are likely to be particularly potent as sources of social identity, because they signal 
an action orientation towards facilitating (as opposed to resisting) the change in question. 
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Again, the specific role of different emotions in different contexts is an empirical question for 
future research. The point here is that the power of emotions derives from how they signal the 
appropriateness of particular group-based representations and actions (Smith, 1993). The 
implications of such processes for social action are also a priority for future research (Kessler 
& Hollbach, 2005; Thomas et al., 2009), as is an examination of other, behavioral indicators 
of self-categorization, such as the emergence of ingroup favoritism (Hogg & Turner, 1987; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  
Conclusion 
The emotional dimensions of group life have received a growing amount of attention, 
particularly in terms of the contribution of groups and social identities to the experience of 
emotions (Iyer & Leach, 2008). What is clear from the present findings is that the relation 
between social identity and emotion is two-way: Although social identities are a potent 
source of emotion, it is also evident that emotions can help to create social identities. While 
social categories have been described as ‘world-making things’ (Reicher, Haslam, & 
Hopkins, 2005, p.556), it is the interplay between one’s own emotional reactions to unfolding 
events and the emotional reactions communicated by others that can provide a basis from 
which shared categories actually come into being. 
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Footnotes 
1. A number of other measures relating to intergroup orientations were included after the 
measures reported here. These included scales of opinion support (two items) and action 
support for (two items) and against (two items) the proposal, collective efficacy for (two 
items) and against (two items) the proposal, and expected validation from team members 
(four items). These measures are not analyzed here because they are more relevant to 
hypotheses regarding intergroup behavior, and collective action specifically; they have 
also not been reported anywhere else. 
2. Participants’ own anger and sadness were significantly correlated (r = .715). Including 
own sadness as a covariate enabled us to study the effects of own anger controlling for its 
shared variance with own sadness. Regression analyses including condition, own anger 
and own sadness as predictors confirmed that no issues of multi-collinearity emerged 
when entering own anger and own sadness together; all tolerance statistics > .488. 
3. The selection of two individuals without replacement arguably creates interdependence 
in the selections. For this reason, we also ran a bootstrapped (non-parametric) version of 
the analysis. This yielded almost identical results; specifically, the 3-way interaction 
between targets’ emotion, condition and own anger was still highly significant, B = -.21, 
SE = .07, 95% CIs = -.352 and -.062.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Interactions between targets (targets 2 and 6 vs. targets 5 and 9), condition (targets’ 
emotions communicated, vs. not communicated [color]), and own anger on social 
distance, shared categorization, and team member selection. Bars represent 
predicted values estimated at low (M – 1SD) and high (M + 1SD) levels of anger. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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